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Introduction 
The status of Japan in the world economy has evidently fallen in 
recent years. China has already taken over not only the status of the 
largest foreign exchange reserves holder in the world<1) but also 
surpassed in terms of its foreign trade and the capital export amount 
In addition, it can be said that the GDP of China is rapidly approachini~ 
that of Japan which Japan has been boasting of, as itcurrently ranks 
second in the world<2)_ The current state of Japanese economy shows 
a very strong contraction, compared with that of 1980s, which was 
praised as "Japan as No. 1 ".
I would like to examine the process for the period from the 1970s, 
when the Japanese economy started to show a remarkable rise in the 
international perspective, to the today's state of slump<3) mainly with 
the limitation to the its external trade. Firstly, I will have a look at the 
major streams of the Japanese economy. 
1. Trend of the Japanese Economy 
- Fall from the Peak — 
Figure 1 shows the trends of the real GDP growth rates of the 
main advanced countries since the 1970s. From the observation of 
the comparison between Japan and other countries, we can conclude 
the following matters. Although Japan had shown a high growth rate 
which remarkably exceeded those of other advanced countries in the 
early part of the 1970s, which stil belonged to the last part of the 
rapid growth period of Japan since 1955, the growth rate of Japan fel 
to be the level with those of other advanced countries, triggered by 
the negative growth which occurred in the year following 1973, which 
33 
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is the year of the first oil shock. Nevertheless, Japan was stil superior 
to others in the 1980s. However, immediately after entering the 1990s, 
which became "the lost decade" for Japan, Japan's performance has 
further fallen to the lowest level among the advanced countries. This 
can be confirmed with Table 1 showing the average real growth rate 
of each decade. Japan's rate had remained higher than that of other 
advanced countries until the 1980s. However, in contrast, it is very 
Figure 1 Trend of Growth Rates of GDP (real) of Main Advanced Countries 
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[Source] OECD, Economic Outlook, various issue. IMF, International Financial Statistics, for 
pre 1976. 
[Note] Germany until 1990 was former West Germany. 
Table 1 Average Growth Rate of GDP (real)(%) 
1970's 1980's ! 1990's 
u s A 3.0 2.5 2.9 
J a p a n 5.4 4.0 1.8 
Germany 3.2 1.7 2.2 
France 4.1 2.3 1.8 
u K 2.6 2.4 2.0 
[Source] and [Note] are the same 
as those in Figure 1. 
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clear that the Japanese economy started to show a striking slump 
after entering the last decade of the 20th century. 
Since Japan overcame two oil shocks which occurred during the 
period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Japan started to be 
called "an economic superpower" and had even secured the status as 
the greatest creditor nation in the world. The 1980s were certainly the 
zenith of the Japanese economy. However, that period was short, and 
the fal came quickly. In other words, as is known, the following years 
longer than 10 years saw a sharp fal from pre-eminence to the 
current gloomy period. 
Let us consider the above circumstances with the use of the 
analysis data of real growth rates of domestic and overseas demand. 
As shown in Figure 2, the rapid growth in the early part of the 1970s 
had been supported by growth thanks to the strong domestic demand, 
as other period of rapid growth. It was, however, the overseas demand 
that led the growth in the first half of the 1980s following the second 
oil shock. As a result, we must admit that there was a sufficient reason 
Figure 2 Trends of Real GDP Growth Rate, Contribution of Domestic and 
Foreign Demand of Japan 
％ 
11 
-゜1 
-2 
-3 
1970 75 80 85 
- groth rate of GDP (reaり□ domestic demand 
90 95 2000 
rJ foreign demand 
[Source] Prepared using 
CD-ROM ancillary to 
the Ministry of Public 
Management, Home 
Affairs, Posts and 
Telecommunications, 
Historical Statistics of 
Japan, new edition, 
2006. 
36 
why the Japanese economy at that time was said to be changed to a 
"foreign demand oriented" economy(4)". 
Thereafter, when the foreign demand became negative, relatively 
strong domestic demand had continued to push up the Japanese 
economy. Despite the growth rate being incomparable, it was as if a 
high growth period had restarted. But, in hindsight, there is no denying 
that it was only a temporary bubble economy and a bitter experience 
to a lot of people. It burst when the economy entered the 1990s, and 
a long-term slump started. After 1995, the economy temporarily 
appeared to be recovering due to domestic demand recovery. We 
saw, however, a complete slowdown and the slump continued. 
In this way, the Japanese economy after the 1970s experienced a 
rapid growth period, a relatively rapid growth and a sluggish period, 
and what is notable is that such development started with the decline 
in the growth rate of domestic demand. As mentioned earlier, the 
overseas demand could lead the economic growth rate, but it is only 
temporary after al, and it can be said that the process in the long 
term had been like that. Next, let us look at the extent of the 
contribution of main constituent items of domestic demand and the 
trend of domestic demand. 
As shown in Figure 3, the main item of domestic demand that is 
marked in its decline is private final consumption, and it is clear that 
the centre of domestic demand has gradually shifted to the gross 
domestic capital formation. In this way, in line with the decline in the 
degree of contribution of private final consumption, the trend of 
domestic demand came to tend to be dependent on the gross 
domestic capital formation. The fact that in the so-called "bubble 
economy" in the latter half of the 1980s, domestic demand was strong, 
centering on gross domestic capital formation, which reminded people 
of the rapid growth period, is sufficient to recognize the structural 
change in the Japanese economy. Another notable factor is that the 
significance of final consumption of government increased the growth 
rate declined. This is clearly seen around 1995 and in and after 1999. 
Nevertheless, this should be seen as the very symbol of the state of 
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Figure 3 Trends of Contribution of Domestic Demand and Each Item (Real 
Terms) of Japan 
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Figure 2. 
the slowdown of the Japanese economy rather than the effect of the 
economic countermeasures of Japanese goverment, in the sense that 
there was no other measure to support the economy. In addition, 
there is no denying that this fact brought a huge debt to the future 
generation . 
Let us look at the external aspects of the Japanese economy. 
Firstly, this can generally be represented by its balance of payments. 
Nevertheless, there is one point that some attention must be called. It 
is that the IMF published the fifth edition of Balance of Payments 
Manual <5) in 1993 and each member country started to publicize their 
statistics of balance of payments on the basis of this edition (Japan 
started publish on the basis of the new manual in 1996). There is 
considerable differences between this fifth edition of the Manual and 
the fourth, which was prepared on the basis of the previous standards 
of the international balance of payments statistics. The differences 
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between the old statistics and the new ones is so great that one 
hesitates to connect the two in one graph(7)_ In this paper, I would like 
to examine the figures in and before 1994 and those in and after 1996 
separately (The reason why I excluded 1995 is stated in Note 1 to 
Figure 5). 
The balance of payments for up to 1994 is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 covers a considerably long period. The figures are therefore 
made real by dividing the amount by the nominal GDP. According to 
this Figure it is estimated that the trend of the current account was 
decided by that of the balance of goods, which can be seen from the 
points that the deficit of the balance of service trade and others and 
Figure 4 Trends of Japanese Balance of Payments No.1 (% to Nominal GDP) 
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the surplus of the investment income balance continued as if they 
were horizontal, and that the form of the balance of goods and that of 
the current account have nearly consistently agreed. In addition, a 
major increase in the surplus of the current account occurred 4 times 
during this period, that is, in the early and latter part of the 1970s, the 
mid-1980s and early 1990. 
On the other hand, if you look at the state of the capital account, it 
is notable that there is a major difference between the 1970s and the 
1980s. The top and the bottom of the surplus of the current account 
experienced twice in the 1970s are dealt with the opposite, movements 
of the balance of monetary movements. Then, the main part of this 
balance monetary movements comprised the composition of the 
change in the gold and foreign exchange reserves and the authorized 
foreign exchange banks (in addition to this, there is "the public sector 
others"). In other words, it can be said that mainly the currency 
authority and the foreign exchange banks responded to the current 
account which broadly showed the same change as the movements 
of the balance of goods. However, from the 1980s the long-terrn 
capital balance started to show a symmetrical movement to thie 
change in the current account, instead of this balance of monetary 
movements. Then, the upper part of the Figure clarifies that the main 
part which decided the trend of this long-term capital balance was 
securities investment(B)_ In addition, what is notable is that the foreign 
exchange banks showed a mirror image of the form of this securities 
investment. 
There is no denying that behind an important change in such 
capital flows, in Japan there was a background of the rapid financial 
liberalization and the abolition of the capital flow regulations which 
started from "Joint Japan-US Ad Hoc Group on Yen/Dollar Exchange 
Rate, Financial and Capital Market Issues", etc. Their detailed 
contents cannot be examined in this paper, but it appears that the 
background triggered the creation of the trends of private capital flows 
which corresponded to the trend of the current account of Japan, an 
inverse relation(9)_ 
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Figure 5 shows the state in or after 1996 (the figures in this Figure 
are not divided by the nominal GDP). At the end of the 1990s, the 
capital and financial account started to show a deficit, compared to 
the surplus of the current account. The trend indicates that change in 
other investment rather than the trend of portfolio investment will 
become the main factor. In addition, in 2003 and 2004, the capital and 
financial account tended to show a surplus, while the surplus of the 
current account expanded, and the deficits of changes in reserve 
assets rapidly increased as if they would offset these surpluses. This 
reflects the results of the very intervention of huge amounts of dollar 
purchases and yen sale by the currency authority to prevent a yen 
Figure 5 Trends of Japanese Balance of Payments 2 (in and after 1995) 
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[Source] Prepared using Monthly Bulletin of Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Figure. 
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capital and financial accounts inclusive. 
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As above, the point that that of the balance on goods decides thait 
of the current account has not changed too much since the 1970s to 
today. However, the trends of the capital and financial account started 
to show a major change during and after the 1980s. This change was 
repeated a few times before reaching today's state. The impact of the 
liberalization of the finance and capital flow is fully reflected in these 
movements. In such circumstances, what was the basic stream of th(e 
trade of Japan like? Next, let us handle this issue. 
2. Structural Change of Japanese Trade 
Firstly, let us look at the composition of trade by main commodities. 
Table 2 shows change in the shares of main export commodities. 
Textiles and textile products, which used to be one of the main expo11 
commodities, have fallen to an extreamely low level. However, 
chemicals, which had once fallen, have been growing beyond the 
previous share. Metals centering on iron and steel appear to hav,e 
Table 2 Changes in Main Export Product Shares(%) 
1970 80 90 j 2000 j 05 
textiles and textile products 12.5 4.8 2.5 j 1.8 j 1.4 
chemicals 6.4 5.3 5.5 i 7.4 ! 8.9 
metals 19.7 16.5 6.8 i 5.5 7.3 
iron and steel 14.7 11.9 4.4 3.1 4.6 
machinery and equipment 46.3 62.7 74.9 74.3 69.6 
nan-electric 10.4 13.9 22.1 21.5 20.3 
electric 14.8 14.4 23.0 26.5 22.2 
transport 17.8 26.5 25.0 21.0 23.1 
automoviles 6.9 17.9 17.8 13.4 13.4 
ships 7.3 3.6 1.9 2.1 2.0 
precision instruments 2.9 5.5 4.8 5.4 3.9 
others 15.1 j 10.7 j 10.3 j 11.0 j 12.8 
[Source] Prepared using each part from Trade White Paper for the period ending 1990 and 
ancillary CD-ROMs to Trade White Paper for 2000 and 2005. 
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Table 3 Change in Main import Product Share(%) 
1970 ! 80 i 90 i 2000 i 05 
foodstuff 13.6 10.4 13.5 12.1 9.8 
raw materials 16.0 9.3 7.2 6.5 6.2 
mineral fuels 20.7 49.8 23.9 20.3 25.6 
chemitals 5.3 4.4 6.9 7.0 7.6 
textiles and textile products 2.0 2.3 5.5 6.5 5.5 
metals 6.8 4.1 6.9 4.8 5.2 
machinery and equipments 12.2 7.0 17.4 31.6 29.6 
others 23.4 12.7 18.7 11.2 10.5 
[Source] The same as in Table 2. 
started to rise from the bottom level. This means that the growing 
trend of the machinery and equipment share which showed a rapid 
increase to three quarters of the total amount of commodity exports of 
Japan not only failed to increase, but rather turned to fal. In addition, 
that is a common phenomenon for non-electric, electric and transport. 
In short, no major change that could be called dramatic has been 
seen in the commodity export structure of Japan in terms of the 
shares in value during and after the 1990s. This fact is a difference 
that cannot be overlooked, compared to the state before that. 
Change in the main import commodity shares is shown in Figure 
3. After the second oil shock, where nearly a half of the total amount 
of imports in value comprised mineral fuels (1980), the feature was 
that the shares of food stuff, raw materials products, and mineral fuels 
retreated (although the share of mineral fuels increased in its own 
way, reflecting the global crude oil price rise) and that the share of 
industrial products centering on machinery and equipment expanded. 
Nevertheless, it appears that there was no marked change, apart 
from a further decline in the status of food stuff and a rise in mineral 
fuels in and after 2000. 
It is observed that the composition of the main commodities both 
in imports and exports have tended to be fixed in general. 
4:3 
Next, let us look at the main trade partners and regions. Firstly, 
Figure 6 shows the wave of the exports. In the latter part of the samH 
Figure, what is primarily remarkable is a consistent rise in the status 
of Asia. The share decline in the latter half of the 1990s took place 
steeply. Needless to say, this is reflected by the currency and financial 
crisis which swept over East Asia at that time. Apart from this, the 
significance of Asia for the export trade of Japan has shown 
continuous and rapid increase since the latter half of the 1980s. 
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Figure 6 Trends of Export Shares by Region and Main Country 
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Taiwan (The same shall apply hereinafter). 
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1970s, and is not a new phenomenon experienced for the first time in 
the latter half in the 1980s. However, the former case was caused by 
aggressive expansion of exports from Japan to oil producing countries 
through the two oil shocks, which are also shown in the temporary 
rise in the Middle East region. It is clear that its lowering status in the 
latter half of the 1980s onwards is in a close and inseparable relation 
with the advent of Asia seen above (Further, the lower share of 
Western Europe beyond the 1990s can be seen as an extension of 
this). 
Therefore, 40% of the Japanese exports were once destined for 
North America, but the percentage has now fallen to below 25%. 
Instead, the situation has changed so that more than 45% of Japanese 
exports are for Asia. 
As the upper part of Figure 6 shows, the above trend of North 
America is nearly exactly the same as that of the USA. It is therefore 
unnecessary to repeat the movement of the USA. What are remarkable 
are the movements of the countries comprising Asia shown in the 
lower part. The rise of the status of China(11) was certainly consistent. 
However, its rapid rise started to be recognized only after entering the 
21st century. Accordingly, NIES (meaning Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan. This shall apply hereinafter) and "Other Asian Countries" 
decided the state of Asia before that. NIES increased their shares 
remarkably in the mid-1980s, followed by "Other Asian Countries" in 
the 1990s. However, both suffered a setback in the subsequent 
currency and financial crisis (it is an interesting phenomenon that the 
status of China was barely affected in this crisis). They have recovered 
their status as at today after that, but NIES have reached only the 
previous peak and "Other Asian Countries" has not recovered to the 
same extent. However, it is worth noting that the status of NIES has 
become conspicuously in line with the rapid fal of the significance of 
the USA after entering the 21st century. In this way, China and NIES 
have come to form a major market which absorbs more than one third 
of al the commodity exports from Japan. 
Next, imports had movements as shown in Figure 7. As the lower 
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part of the same Figure shows, imports in Asia have already exceeded 
those in North America in the mid-1970s. The importance of the samH 
region continued to rise after a sharp fal in the share of the Middle 
East in the latter half of the 1970s (However, the proportion of the 
Middle East has recently risen with the crude price rise, and has 
exceeded that of North America again). In this way, the present 
situation is that the proportion of Asia as an import region is nearly thE3 
same as that of Asia as an export region at around 45%. 
The upper part of the same Figure shows that the rise of Asia was 
mainly due to the rise of the status of NIES until the mid-1980s, and 
after that it depended mainly on the expansion of the proportion of 
China. However, in recent years, the status of NIES has tended to fal 
and the status of "Other Asian Countries" has been stagnant. It 
appears that the recent rapid increase in the significance of Asia has 
been regulated entirely by the movements of the significance of 
China. In addition, the proportion of the USA, which had shown nearly 
Figure 7 Trends of Import Shares of Japan by Region and Main Country 
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the same trend as that of North America, also started to show rapid 
decline since the end of the 1990s. 
In this way, if you look at the state of the Japanese trade during 
and after the 1970s, it can be summarized that during and after the 
mid-1980s when the effect of two oil shocks is considered to have 
nearly ceased, the status of Asia rose and that of the USA retreated 
as a whole, and if you look at exports and imports separately, notable 
matters are a rapid rise in the proportion of China and a fal in that of 
the USA on the export front in and after the Asian currencies and 
financial crises and an increase in the significance of China and a 
rapid fal in that of the USA on the import, which was seen for the first 
time since the end of the 1990s. The major expansion in the location 
of Asia centering on China in the Japanese trade, which we have so 
far seen, has shown the same movement as the rise in the same 
region in the world's economy. This is broadly reflected in Japanese 
trade. Then, how is Japanese trade seen from the other side? Now, 
let us examine the state of Asia and that of Japan in the world 
economy and the status of Japan in Asian trade for the purpose of 
understanding the present state of Japanese trade from these 
aspects. 
3. Rise of Asian Trade and Japan 
Firstly, let us confirm the rise of Asian trade and status of Japanese 
in recent years by examining the trends of the compositions by region, 
and main countries engaged in the world trade in and after the 
1970s. 
Figure 8 shows the trends of the proportions of the main regions 
and the main countries in the world's commodity exports. As shown in 
the lower part of Figure 8, the shares of advanced countries in the 
world trade had gradually fallen and developing countries increased 
until the early part of the 1970s had gradually fallen respectively. 
People tended to think that the two oil shocks reversed this trend. 
However, in hindsight, it was clearly only a temporary phenomenon. 
The reason is that when entering the 1980s the basic trend recovered 
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Figure 8 Trends of Shares of World's Exports by Region and Main Countr:v 
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with the lowering crude oil price. Nevertheless, what should be noted 
as a movement after that is that the falling status of advanced 
countries = the rising status of developing countries has continued as 
a tendency for the period from the latter half of the 1980s to today. In 
addition, the share expansion of developing countries is in parallel 
with "Other Asia" excluding West Asia. In this way, it is a fact that 
cannot be denied that the very increase in the export share of "Other 
Asia" has been the leading part of this trend phenomenon for・that 
period. 
The following matters can be pointed out from the locus of th1e 
shares of main countries shown in the upper part of Figure 8. 
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The share of the USA, which had maintained top status for a long 
time, had been in a falling trend up until the mid-1980s, and was 
exceeded by the share of Germany (then West Germany) in the mid-
1980s, and was very close to the share of Japan which followed 
Germany. However, the status of the USA turned to rise slightly, and 
managed to secure again top status. However, it fel sharply at the 
end of the 20th century and Germany again surpassed the USA, which 
has remained up to today. In this way, it can be said that the recent 
fal of the USA in the world's commodity exports is truly remarkable. 
On the other hand, Germany lowered its significance for the period 
from the latter half of the 1970s to the first half of the 1980s. However, 
it raised its status in the latter half of the 1980s, and continued to 
compete with the USA for top status for a considerable period. 
Nevertheless, Germany's share started to fal around the time when 
integration (in 1990) with East Germany was achieved and remained 
at a low level. After that, Germany became the largest commodity 
export country in the world not because it had recovered its former 
significance but because the status of the USA had declined. 
It was NIES that made remarkable progress until the mid-1990s. 
However, after that the force then ceased, and the total of the four 
countries has been maintained at about the same proportion as that 
of Germany. The proportion of China has consistently been in a rising 
trend. However, the rising trend started to show a rapid acceleration 
at the end of the 1990s onwards. In other words, China started to 
show a rapid progress, triggered by the Asian currency and financial 
crisis in 1997. 
Next, if you look at Japan, its share remained in a rising trend up 
until the mid-1980s. In particular, in the first half of the 1980s, Japan 
continued to show a rapid progress immediately before it exceeded 
the USA. However, Japan's progress ended there. The movement 
started to show a reverse trend immediately after that. Although there 
was a temporary rise between the end of the 1980s and the early part 
of the 1990s, Japan began to show a rapid fal after that and was not 
only taken over by NIES but became ranked after China in the present 
4B 
situation. 
Next, let us look at the trend of the world's import shares. As 
Figure 9 shows_, the trends broadly resemble that of the export shares 
but are not so dramatic. Firstly, regarding the shares of advanced 
countries and developing countries, as shown in the lower part of 
Figure 9, the expansion of the latter and the setback of the former are 
recognized for the period of the two oil shocks. But, the rise in the 
share of West Asia was not particularly strong in imports, which was 
a different point from exports. After the period of the reversal which 
took place in the mid-1980s (the rise in the status of advanced 
countries = the fal of developing countries), the trend until today is 
the long-term decline in the significance of the advanced countries 
and the long-term rise of the significance of the developing countries, 
and itis also clear that the rise of "Other Asia" is the greatest factor of 
this phenomenon. 
According to the trends of the shares by main countries and 
regions shown in the upper part of Figure 9, firstly the USA can bie 
Figure 9 Trends of Shares of World's Imports by Region and Main Countr:v 
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divided into 4 phases, that is, 1) the share expansion period until the 
first half of the 1980s, 2) the period of setback after that, 3) the rising 
period in the early part of the 1990s and 4) the period of setback at 
the end of the 1990s onwards. However, no decline has been seen 
until today, compared to a fal having been seen in commodity exports. 
It can be said that the USA has secured its status as the largest 
goods importer market in the world as a nation. 
If you look at the main part of the components of "Other Asia", it is 
the rise of the status of NIES until the mid-1990s and a further rise in 
the status of China after that. Here, the Asian currency and financial 
crisis is recognized as a turning point. Then, regarding Japan, it can 
be seen that the trends of import shares do not show ups and downs 
as that of the export shares, but an expansion trend had been seen 
until the first half of the 1980s, and there was a subsequent trend of 
a long time decline. The recent state is that Japan has been taken 
over by China here. 
As seen in the former section, the rise of the status of Asia in 
Japanese trade has been remarkable in recent years and especially 
the status of China. It is easy to imagine that this has made the trend 
of expansion of Asia and China in the world trade moves on the same 
lines. Compared to this, the shares of Japanese exports and imports 
continued to fal during and after the latter half of the 1980s, and 
Japan has given over its status to China. This fact is sufficient to 
estimate that the significance of Japan has fallen in Asian trade. 
Lastly, let us look at the partners of imports and exports of Asian 
developing regions, bearing this point in mind. 
As we have already seen, the rise of Asian trade today is part of 
the nearly consistent tide during and after the latter half of the 1980s, 
Figure 10 below shows the state in and after 1985. As shown in the 
upper part of Figure 10, the total amount of exports of Asian developing 
regions which had tended to increase until the mid-1990s temporarily 
declined after that, but a period of rapid increase has started in recent 
years. The lower part of Figure 10 shows the continually lowering 
share of advanced countries and the increasing share of developing 
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Figure 10 Total Amount of Exports of Asian Developing Countries and 
Trend of Shares of their Main Destinations 
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combined. The Middle East is not 
included in Asia here. 
countries. In addition, it is clear that the trend of the expansion of the 
proportion of the latter is nearly the same as the trends of th,e 
expansion of the proportion of the Asian developing regions (The 
share of advance countries temporarily recovered at the end of the 
1990s, and its movement was nearly the same as that of the USA). In 
this way, more than 40% of exports of Asian developing regions are 
destined for the same region at present. In such a state, the proportion 
of the USA fel below 20%, and that of Japan declined below 1 O°lc>, 
and China has exceeded both countries. 
The trend of the shares of import origine of the Asian developing 
regions is shown in Figure 11. Regarding the particulars of the total 
amount shown in the upper part of Figure 11, broadly the same points 
can be observed as stated in exports. This clearly indicates a setback 
of the status of advanced countries and the progress of developing 
regions centering on China. However, the import shares of developing 
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Figure 11 Total Amount of Imports of Asian Developing Countries and 
Trends of Shares of their Main Origins 
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countries have expanded not only with the USA but also with other 
countries coutracted. It can be said that the significance of the USA 
has always been low as a country of origin. However, its lowering 
trend cannot be denied together with that of Japan, the share of which 
used to be relatively high. It can also be seen that the status of China 
has risen as an import origin, although it is not so high as an export 
destination 
As is clarified by the above examination, the proportion of Asian 
trade has gradually been rising in Asian developing regions which 
continue to expand in the long term, and the present proportions of 
both imports and exports have largely exceeded 40% or reached that 
level at present. Amid such a trend, the status of Japanese trade has 
fallen. 
5:3 
Conclusion 
Japanese trade was extinguished by a tragic defeat in World War 
11(12)_ Although it was a factor outside the economy as a defeat of war, 
such a situation has never occurred in the modern economic history 
of Japan. However, around when the restoration period from the war 
was over, recovery of Japanese trade became unshakable, and the 
result was that Japan progressed in leaps and bounds not only in the 
high growth period but also in the periods of two oil shocks. In our 
consideration, we have seen such movement reaching its zenith in 
the 1980s. Then, after that, Japan's international setback has 
continued. Such a long-term decline in its status was the first sucl1 
experience in the modern history of Japan. In addition, this phenomenon 
is occurring in the normal economic process. 
It is possible to point out a lot of factors such as the rise of Asia in 
the world trade and the contrasting state of Japan, no dynamic 
structural change like its trade in the rising period having been seen 
in the composition of import and export commodities, a higheir 
dependence on Asian countries centering on China in the compositions 
by region, where Japanese status of the other parties has been 
declining. The starting point of these phenomena was in the 1980s. 
Yoshimasa Nishimura who had taken the posts such as Director of 
the former Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance says about 
financial system reform of Japan, as follows: 
"The 1980s were a golden period of the Japanese economy in a 
sense. It was essentially the last chance where a financial reforrn 
should have been carried out to enable a sustainable development 
beyond the 1990s in which an additional difficult condition such as 
decline in the population is expected to take place, by utilizing the 
substantial economic power at that time. From another viewpoint, 
Japan was not able to fil in its superfluous economic power for an 
"economic structural adjustment" but has invited a bubble economy, 
caused by intensified trade friction, forced landing by storong yen and 
excessive savings. For this period, Japanese became overconfident 
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of their real ability . . . stagnant of progress was seen . . . . . . and,
especially, its status in the international competitiveness in the 
financial industry has been left behind (13)_" 
Nevertheless, the same thing had also occurred in its external 
trade. 
[Notes] 
(1) For immediate reference, I can suggest my works;'Increase in foreign 
currency reserves'Shogaku Ronshu (Kansai University), Vol.51 No.1,2,3 
Aug. 2006 and'The Change of the structure of the capital and financial 
account of Japan and foreign government assets of the USA'ibird. Vol.51 
No.4, Oct. 2006. 
(2) According to the World Bank's data, the GDP of Japan in 2005 was 
$4,505.9 bn, the real growth rate was 1.3% (an average of 2000-2005), 
and those of China were $2,228.9 bn and 9.6% (that of same period) 
respectively (World Development Report 2007 (Japanese ed.), p.390). If 
this real growth rate continues in the future, Japan will be taken over by 
China in these figures in 2014. In any case, it is nearly certain that China 
will rank with Japan in the first half of the 201 Os. 
(3) I have once examined Japanese trade for the 1970s in some detail, which 
was published in Shogaku Ronshu, Vol.37 No.6, Feb. 1993, Vol.38 No.1, 
April 1993 and Vol.38 No.3,4, Oct. 1993. At that time, I showed my outlook 
on Japanese trade for the 1980s to some extent, but I was hesitated 
somewhat to have a full-scale review on Japanese trade during and after 
the 1980s. The reason is that it was difficult for me to have a ful image of 
that. However, I now could manage to have my own recognition. This 
paper was originally intended to be an introduction of my study on 
Japanese trade for the 1980s, but was recompiled as an independent 
thesis. 
(4) Ministry of International Trade and Industry, White Paper on Japanese 
Trade 1988, p.147. 
(5) For example, the debts of the government stood at 224.6 trillion yen which 
corresponded to 46.4% of GDP at the end of fiscal year 1992, but 
expanded to 668.8 trillion yen which corresponded to 134.5% of GDP at 
the end of fiscal year 2002. Calculated by the CD-ROM ancillary to 
Historical Statistics of Japan, new edition, 2006. 
(6) IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, fifth ed., 1993 
(7) Please refer for the difference between the fourth edition and the fifth 
edition of Balance of Payments Manual to the following literature. How to 
5!5 
read and think of the International Balance of Payments, Chuo Keizaisha, 
1998, from p.195 onwards. 
(8) Direct investment, which is another mainstay of the long-term capital and 
financial account, was a continuous deficit (net outflow), and itcan be said 
that although temporary deficits have become conspicuous for the period 
from the end of the 1980s to the early part of the 1990s, it was not so 
large to decide the trends of the long-term capital and financial account. 
(9) Please refer for the financial liberalization and the abolition of capital flow 
deregulation of Japan for this period to the following literature. Yoshimasa 
Nishimura, Reformation of Financial System of Japan, 2003, History of 
Public Finance in the Years of Showa covering 197 4 to 1988, Vol. 7, 2004, 
Part 1, Chapter 2 and 3. It is said that the USA aimed to appreciate th1~ 
yen rate by requesting Japan to carry out financial liberalization and capital 
flow liberalization such as in the so-called'Japan-US Yen Dollar CommitteH' 
in vain. However, Haruhiko Kuroda said,'It is ironical that this rapid 
financial liberalization bore a part in the formation of the asset bubble i1 
the Japanese economy in the latter half of the 1980s.'(Success and 
Failure of Public Finance and Financial Policy, 2005, p.75 and Rise and 
Fall of Currencies, 2005, p.161 onwards.) 
(10) Please refer this point to my works in Note 1 for immediate reference. 
(11) Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, but the economic relationship 
between it and Mainland China was becoming close before then ('China-
British Joint Declaration", where the return of Hong Kong was decided, 
was signed in 1984, and enforced in the following year), and it is 
considered that an element that Hong Kong has become a region for 
entrepot trade for Mainland China has increased. I therefore decided to 
examine using statistical data unifying Hong Kong and Mainland China 
here. This is also certainly partly for the purpose of securing consistency 
in the time sequence. 
(12) What symbolizes this is the closure of the Japanese customs in 194~l. 
Incidentally, the customs was reopened after the war in 1946. 
(13) The above publication by Nishimura, p.19 
